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Abstract 
 
Behavioral biometrics, being non-intrusive and 
cost-efficient, have the potential to assist user 
identification and authentication. However, user 
behaviors can vary significantly for different hardware, 
software, and applications. Research of behavioral 
biometrics is needed in the context of a specific 
application. Moreover, it is hard to collect user data in 
real world settings to assess how well behavioral 
biometrics can discriminate users. This work aims to 
improving authentication by behavioral biometrics 
obtained for user groups. User data of a webmail 
application are collected in a large-scale user 
experiment conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Used in a continuous authentication scheme based on 
user groups, off-line identity attribution and online 
authentication analytic schemes are proposed to study 
the applicability of application-specific behavioral 
biometrics. Our results suggest that the useful user 
group identity can be effectively inferred from users’ 
operational interaction with the email application. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Companies are exposed to great risk of compromised 
user accounts and insider attacks. In a recent global 
study featuring 208 companies, 69% of enterprise 
security professionals admitted having experienced 
theft or corruption of company information at the hands 
of trusted insiders [1]. Sharing credentials among 
employees makes it more difficult for an IT system to 
identify such attempts through authentication [2]. 
Conventional authentication scheme often does not 
verify users’ authenticity continuously during active 
sessions, leaving unattended computer systems 
vulnerable to unauthorized use [3]. It has been widely 
realized by the security community that traditional 
identity and access management controls, which are 
static and rigid, can no longer effectively protect 
valuable information assets once user account 
credentials are compromised [4]. There is a higher risk 
of abuse for mobile devices when they fall in wrong 
hands. 
Role-based access control (RBAC) regulates access 
to enterprise system resources based on the roles of 
individual users within an enterprise [5]. RBAC enables 
users to carry out a wide range of authorized tasks by 
dynamically managing their actions according to 
functions, relationships, and constraints that can be 
flexibly defined for user account groups [6]. This 
contrasts with other methods of access control, which 
grant or revoke user access on an object-by-object basis. 
However, misconfiguration of RBAC systems, such as 
orphaned accounts and shared accounts, exposes 
enterprise assets to an increased level of risk of insider 
attack who can steal data beyond a user’s access 
privilege [7]. 
Biometrics-assisted authentication schemes help 
with identity recognition by matching physiological or 
behavioral traits to users who are be authenticated. 
However, several issues exist with current biometrics-
based authentication systems: (1) required special 
hardware or software can be expensive and intrusive to 
existing authentication processes, which causes privacy 
and reliability issues; (2) a user’s identity stays 
unverified beyond initial authentication, posing a risk as 
described previously; (3) behavioral biometrics analysis 
is isolated from specific application contexts, 
information of which can likely contribute to the 
effectiveness of biometrics-assisted authentication 
solutions. It is of necessity to study behavioral 
biometrics in a specific application context, i.e., taking 
in consideration knowledge of its operations. 
In this work, we propose a Context-Specific 
Behavioral Biometrics Augmented Authentication 
Scheme by assuming that inherent differences exist for 
a special type of task among dissimilar groups (roles) of 
users that can augment authentication and access 
control. Application-specific behavioral biometrics 
recognize patterns in high-level human computer 
interaction under a specific application context [8], e.g., 
UI designs and system architecture. A behavioral user 
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profile can be developed based on a user’s behavior that 
is associated with the typical usage of one type of 
application.  
We explored the feasibility and applicability of using 
application-specific behavioral biometrics by the 
example of a common webmail application, instead of 
application-independent behavioral biometrics, e.g., 
voice, eye movement, keystrokes and scrolling or 
clicking activities. We customized logging functionality 
on top of existing web event-listening mechanisms of 
the webmail application and saved behavioral logs of 
specific user operations. We extracted interpretable 
context-specific features from such behavioral log data, 
which were used for group-based authentication. The 
labelling of user groups was derived from clustering 
these behavioral biometric features. We investigated a 
set of classifiers for offline identify attribution to infer 
the user group of each user from behavioral log data and 
applied a sliding window approach to support 
continuous online authentication. Evaluation results 
suggest that the introduced behavioral biometrics can be 
applied to effectively classifying users’ group identities 
in authentication during an active web session. 
We aimed to make three-fold contributions in this 
research effort. First, we extended the concept of 
behavioral biometrics to incorporate the consideration 
of a specific application or system and designed a 
scheme of augmenting authentication utilizing such 
behavioral biometrics. Second, we proposed and 
examined offline identity attribution by mining user log 
data and online authentication to recognize user 
behavior patterns continuously. Third, we evaluated our 
methods through k-fold cross-validation for accuracy to 
test their feasibility. 
 
2. Background 
 
The challenge of identity recognition and 
verification for authentication in information systems is 
essentially the tradeoff between security of such a 
scheme and its overall cost and usability. While physical 
biometrics are mostly stored as credentials on the server 
or locally at the risk of being stolen, user behavioral 
profiles used for authentication usually possess no value 
to attackers [9]. Moreover, physical biometrics leaves 
more room for spoofing attempts. Therefore, behavioral 
biometric systems recently have been explored 
extensively in addition to physical biometrics. 
 
2.1. Continuous authentication 
 
Furnell et al. [10] found that users have a reasonable 
expectation of continuous or periodical authentication 
throughout their daily use of an IT system that tried to 
maintain confidence in identity management. Both 
physical biometrics and behavior indicators were 
investigated and received positive feedback from users. 
Location-based access control [11] and behavioral 
biometrics, notably keystroke dynamics and mouse 
movement [12-14] can provide common forms of 
implicit authentication. More recently, accelerometers 
and other sensors in mobile devices have been used to 
profile and identify users. Chang et al. [15] used 
accelerometers in television remote controls to identify 
individuals. Kale et al. [16] and Gafurov et al. [17] used 
gait recognition to detect whether a device is being used 
by its actual owner. These biometrics and location-
based approaches are relevant to our work to 
demonstrate the potential applicability of behavioral 
biometrics to authentication.  
The convergence of multiple biometric indicators of 
identity is another current development that combines 
multiple biometric factors to support an authentication 
decision [18, 19]. For example, Greenstadt and Beale 
[20] formulated a concept of “cognitive security” for 
personal devices. Specifically, they proposed a multi-
modal approach “in which many different low-fidelity 
streams of biometric information are combined to 
produce an ongoing positive recognition of a user.” 
These works have enriched the knowledge body of 
behavioral biometrics. Though they did not specifically 
touch on how behavioral biometrics can be further 
formulated under certain software or hardware context. 
 
2.2. Keystroke dynamics 
 
Users interact with a computer through I/O devices 
in specific ways. Patterns associated to individual users 
can be recognizable in scenarios where there is a 
repetition of interactions, such as typing one’s 
credentials on a regular basis. Keystroke dynamics 
refers to a mechanism of recording one’s behavioral 
biometrics in during typing, which provides an 
accessible manner for individual user authentication and 
identification [21]. Investigated features for keystroke 
dynamics vary from simple metrics of key press interval 
and dwelling times, e.g., the up-up time, up-down time, 
and down-down time, to multi-key features, e.g., bi-
graph and trigraph [22].  
Classification methods have been researched 
extensively to use these features in making 
authentication decisions, including initial and 
continuous authentication. Less researched keystroke 
features include overall typing speed, frequency of 
errors (i.e., use of backspace), use of the numpad, the 
order in which a user presses the shift key for capital 
letters, and possibly the force with which keys are hit 
using special keyboards [23]. Keystroke dynamics aims 
to model user typing patterns independent of the 
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application context to suit computer systems that 
involve the use of keyboard. Studies mostly ignore how 
the contextual information of different applications 
influences such behavioral biometrics. 
 
2.3. Mouse movement  
 
Mouse dynamics, as a behavioral biometric for 
analyzing behavior data from pointing devices, e.g., 
mouse or touchpad, can aid authentication in an 
accessible and convenient manner. Hashia et al. [24] and 
Bours et al. [25] presented preliminary results on using 
mouse dynamics for user authentication. They both 
asked participants to perform fixed sequences of mouse 
operations and analyzed behavioral characteristics of 
mouse movement to identify a user during the login 
stage. Distance-based classifiers were established to 
compare the validation data with the enrollment data. 
Hashia et al. collected data from 15 participants using 
one computer, while Bours et al. collected data from 28 
participants using different computers; they achieved 
equal-error rates (EERs) of 15% and 28% respectively. 
Aksari et al. [26] presented an authentication framework 
for verifying users based on a fixed sequence of mouse 
movement. Features were extracted from nine 
movements among seven squares displayed 
consecutively on a computer screen. They built a 
classifier based on a scaled Euclidean distance using 
data from both legitimate users and impostors. The 
researchers reported to achieve an EER of 5.9% over 10 
users collected from on the same computer. GUI design 
and different computer platforms can have a significant 
impact on user mouse movement. One-size-fit-all 
behavioral biometrics should be examined in different 
meaningful application contexts. 
 
3. Research design 
 
Our work is based on an empirical user study that 
collected user operations of fine granularity using a 
modified web application [27, 28]. This user study 
instructed participants recruited online to sort 40 emails 
using a webmail system. Each email was classified as 
either legitimate or phishing. The main goal was to 
enable these participants to interact unbiasedly with a 
web-based application and to capture realistic user 
behaviors in doing so. Email sorting embodies one of 
the most typical computer applications. It is viable if not 
ideal to establishing the validity of the proposed 
authentication scheme. Such context-specific 
behavioral biometrics are based on one applicable 
platform among many other possibilities. The nature of 
user operations is expected to vary for different 
applications, which makes research findings specific to 
intended applications. 
3.1. Behavior data collection 
 
Existing literatures often give out just a few details 
about the instrumentation used to collect user behavioral 
data and most studies hosted human subject experiments 
in a highly controlled lab environment [20, 22, 24-26]. 
There have been successful examples of employing 
participants remotely, e.g., using the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk human subject pool, to perform 
research-focused tasks [29-31]. Specifically, Bartneck 
et al. [29] showed that recruiting such participants is 
efficient and affordable for certain types of user tasks. 
In our case, we hosted the user study experiment on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk and recruited participants of 
differing backgrounds from over twenty US states. We 
instructed them to classify 40 emails into two categories, 
i.e., legitimate and phishing, within a given amount of 
time on Roundcube, a webmail system 
(http://www.roundcube.net]. 
 
 
Figure 1. Data collection and continuous 
authentication framework overview 
 
The Roundcube webmail application is implemented 
via HTML, JavaScript and PHP. The primary way to 
interact with the application is through mouse hovering 
over and clicking on buttons, links, email address, etc. 
on a web browser. We embedded special JavaScript 
code in HTML files dynamically generated by 
Roundcube to capture users’ interaction with the 
system, including mouse hovering and clicking as two 
primary event types. We utilized AJAX to send captured 
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user behavior information remotely to a logging service 
running on the Roundcube server. Each participant had 
a separate log file generated on the server, recording all 
the operations throughout his/her active session using 
the webmail application.  
As shown in Figure 1, extracted behavioral features 
from the log data can be used to develop a classifier of 
the user group identify for authentication purposes. A 
user is initially authenticated using stored credentials, 
e.g., a password, and associated with a user group, e.g., 
system administrators or regular users. During online 
authentication, sub-samples of in-session log data are 
sent continuously to the classifier in real time that 
updates the prediction of the group identity for a current 
user. Alarms will be triggered or challenges issued to 
this user if a mismatched group identity is suspected. 
 
3.2. Overview of the data  
 
We conducted the user experiment with 205 human 
subjects recruited from the Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
ending up with 177 users completing all the experiment 
phases and only 146 participants completely sorting all 
the 40 emails. There was data loss due to issues of the 
server, network transmission, and the client end. 
Furthermore, these participants were assigned to four 
conditions determined by the presence of a secondary 
question-answering tasks and/or a monetary incentive. 
After a careful examination of log files, we selected the 
data for 35 participants that were in coherent condition. 
 
 
Figure 2. Data collection description 
Figure 2 provides a brief description of the data 
collected of user interactions with the emails. We 
defined the behavioral log format based on the HTTP 
common log format, which includes five fields of server 
timestamp, client timestamp, user identifier, action 
event, and action object. Clicking and hovering, two 
essential ways of interacting with the webmail 
application, can be further classified as hovering in and 
hovering out and clicking on application buttons and 
email related information, such as sender address, links 
and attachment. 
Demographic information was collected for each of 
the participants, including age, gender, education level, 
language background, education of cyber awareness, 
etc. An ANOVA test was conducted to determine if 
there was any significant difference among different 
demographic groups in terms of the biometric features 
listed later in Section 3.3. The tests result suggested 
demographic groups showed no correlation with these 
features.  
 
3.3. Exacting features 
 
The features extraction stage characterizes a user’s 
behavioral biometric information. Unlike traditional 
behavioral biometric systems, the proposed application-
specific scheme extracted user behavioral features that 
directly interpretable within the context of the 
Roundcube webmail application. Four features were 
developed to represent distinctive behavioral 
characteristics of users based on available web interface 
APIs that capture email processing operations. 
1) Processing Time is defined as the time taken by 
each participant from the moment they open an 
email to the moment they assign a rating of 
confidence level of classifying the email. 
2) Reaction Time is defined as the time taken by each 
participant from the moment they assign a rating of 
confidence level to the moment they classify the 
email into one category. 
3) Phishing Tells Checking Bit is a binary value to 
indicate whether the participant has checked an 
email is coming from a legitimate source, i.e., 
hovering over the sender’s address. 
4) Rating is defined as the confidence level assigned 
by participants of how strongly they believe the 
email falls into the chosen category of legitimate or 
phishing. A participant was mandated to give a 
confidence rating to each email before the email 
was moved into the classified category. This value 
ranges from 1 to 10, with 10 to denote the highest 
confidence. 
These four independent features were extracted and 
each feature was represented by a numerical variable. 
All these values can be derived from the log file for each 
user and each instance of email processing. In this 
manner, unstructured textual log files were converted 
into vectorized features.  
 
3.4. Offline identity attribution and online 
authentication 
 
Our approach combines classical unsupervised and 
supervised machine learning algorithms to instrument 
offline identity attribution and online authentication. 
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Attribution is defined as the assignment of a user’s 
behavior to a group identity. We differentiate offline 
attribution and online classification based on not merely 
different feature sets but also their purposes of 
identification and authentication respectively. 
Identification involves user profiling to generate distinct 
user classes or groups based on their distinguishable 
characteristics, while authentication is the verification 
of claimed identification. 
In offline identity attribution, the entire log file 
generated by each user is used to evaluate the group that 
this user belongs to. It combines all the features in email 
processing, i.e., 4 features by 40 emails. Therefore, 
group identity attribution is based on complete user data 
to profile user behavioral patterns. More specifically, 
the group identity of each user was derived through 
unsupervised clustering.  
The online authentication scheme works in a way 
that an alert is triggered when a user’s real-time 
behavioral biometric features deviate drastically from 
the supposed group identity, e.g., being associated to the 
user through initial authentication using a password. 
This scheme presents a viable approach of continuous 
authentication with minimal computational cost and 
response time. A sliding window approach was used to 
feed a classifier features in the most recent segment of 
processing emails during user interactions. 
 
 
Figure 3. A sliding email window where 
training and testing instances are created 
by shifting a window frame over 
processed emails (l=3, r=1; l=4, r=2) 
As shown in Figure 3, a window frame contains a 
certain number of emails, defined as the window length 
l. This data processing window moves over the emails 
being processed in time order to create multiple 
instances of vectorized behavioral biometric features in 
the active session of a user. Each vector instance 
consists of the 4 features averaged over the number of 
emails in the current window frame. The other 
parameter of this sliding window approach, the shift r, 
is the number of emails being replaced for each frame. 
In our scheme, the sliding window cannot be designed 
using a fixed time interval. Moreover, the window 
length l is an indicator of how soon this continuous 
authentication scheme can detect irregularities in real 
implementation. 
 
3.5. Summary of the analysis methodology  
 
The multi-stage analysis is illustrated in Figure 4. 
The pre-processing stage vectorizes log data in pre-
defined format to extract the features as defined. We 
first tried out three clustering algorithms to determine a 
plausible number of user groups based on their 
distinctive behavioral patterns. We then assigned the 
group labels derived from clustering results to each user. 
After that we employed a set of classification algorithms 
to go through training and testing in both offline and 
online modes. 
 
 
Figure 4. Training and testing stages for 
identity attribution and online 
authentication 
 
In online authentication, if consecutive email 
window frames of emails processed by a user generate 
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a classification different from the originally associated 
user group, it would be compelling evidence that the 
current user might not be the claimed user. 
 
4. Clustering, training, and testing 
 
4.1. Dimensionality reduction 
 
We conducted statistical analysis to determine the 
effect that each feature had on the unsupervised 
clustering results. Specifically, we performed an 
exploratory principal component analysis (PCA) of all 
the features of the users, to remove redundant features 
as the first step before clustering and classification to 
extract most useful components. The PCA algorithm 
automatically compares the number of data points and 
the number of features in determining the resulting 
components.  
 
 
Figure 5. Dimensionality reduction by PCA 
 
As in Figure 5, we arrived at this number by plotting 
the percentage of variance captured by the kth 
component. By examining the plots, we determined that 
85% of the resulting components capture nearly 100% 
of the variance. For the group consisting of 35 data 
points, 29 components are kept. So, the data was 
whitened to remove correlated variables. 
 
4.2. Clustering and initial labeling 
 
Users of similar behavioral patterns are allocated 
into clusters using three clustering algorithms, i.e., k-
means, hierarchical (agglomerative), and mean shift, on 
the feature vectors. 
Mean Shift clustering grouped most points into a 
single cluster, with some points as their own clusters. 
Both k-means and hierarchical clustering gave out 2 
almost identical clusters. Hierarchical clustering did not 
always give consistent number of clusters, i.e., it was 
more susceptible to finding different local optima each 
time the algorithm was run. Therefore, it looks that the 
best clustering algorithm for the dataset is k-Means. 
Specifically, as shown in Figure 6, 21 out of 35 
participants were found belonging to one cluster, and 14 
out of 35 belonging to the other.  
 
Figure 6. Identity attribution clustering result 
 
In further evaluation, we considered the two cluster 
labels potentially reflect two group identities in the 
original dataset and conducted in-sample validation 
after PCA. However, it is hard to interpret exactly what 
would these group identities translate into. A probable 
explanation would be some users are more security 
conscious as they perform the email sorting tasks with 
relatively more time invested, and better email sorting 
performance achieved. However, it is hard to find proof 
due to the lack of knowledge of the participant users. 
The optimum number of clusters was evaluated only 
using the Silhouette Coefficient metric. Details about 
evaluation metrics will be addressed in Section 5. 
 
4.3. Data generation for online authentication  
 
Differences between legitimate and phishing emails 
could affect user behavior of email processing when 
implementing our email window approach for online 
authentication. On the one hand, training using binary 
email classification as features does not encode enough 
information to do good classification predictions. On the 
other hand, it is inherently unrealistic to know the nature 
of each email in real world and to control the order in 
which the emails are coming. As the result, we took a 
sliding window over emails listed in the randomized 
order that these 40 emails came for these participants. 
And we assumed that if the window size is large enough, 
we should be able to capture adequate information to 
smooth out effect of mixed normal and phishing emails. 
In one window frame, the email processing features are 
averaged over the contained emails, which results in a 
data point. Another advantage of this method is that this 
approach generates significantly more data points for 
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training purposes compared to using the entire log file 
for a user as one data point. This can thus help to build 
better classifiers. The chosen sliding email window 
influences the key parameters in classifier algorithms, 
which will be reported in Section 5.  
After creating the sliding email window dataset, we 
assigned cluster labels to the resulting dataset. Each data 
point in the email window dataset will inherit the label 
of the user it belongs to. 
 
4.4. Classification and evaluation 
 
We now have 2 datasets with corresponding group 
labels for supervised learning or classification. We did 
classification using 7 different classifiers. The method 
for testing accuracy is k-fold cross validation, where k = 
3 for offline identity attribution and k = 5 for online 
authentication using the sliding email window dataset. 
The final accuracy for each classifier is calculated by 
averaging the k-fold accuracy results. The 7 classifiers 
we have used are: 
1) K-Nearest Neighbors 
2) Logistic Regression 
3) Support Vector Machine 
4) Linear Discriminant Analyses 
5) Gaussian Naïve Bayes 
6) Decision Tree 
7) Random Forest 
 
5. Result analysis 
 
Extensive analysis was conducted to examine the 
reliability and efficacy of the proposed approach. The 
evaluation of group identity is essentially two-class 
classification based on the clustering results. For offline 
identity attribution, we compared the classification 
performance before and after PCA. For continuous 
online authentication, we examined the classification 
performance of these classifiers with different 
parameters. 
We considered performance metrics of accuracy 
(ACC), Area under Curve (AUC), as well as the time 
delay. ACC measures how well a binary classification 
test correctly identifies an observation and is defined as 
the ratio of the number of correct classifications to the 
testing sample size. AUC is defined as the area under a 
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, which 
is equivalent to the probability that the classifier will 
rank a randomly chosen positive instance higher than a 
randomly chosen negative instance [32]. For 
convenience, the definition of true positive and false 
positive here is based on the two clusters, not in the 
original sense of legitimate users and intruders. 
Specifically, in plotting and calculation, cluster label 0 
represents the negative class while label 1 the positive. 
We like to make a couple notes here. A 
misclassification is classifying one user wrongly to a 
different group.  So, there is no need to further define 
false positive and false negative. Therefore, essentially 
every misclassification could result in a legitimate user 
being unauthenticated, comparable to the effect of a 
false alarm. The delay required by an online 
authentication scheme is the amount of time to collect 
and process sufficient behavioral data for a decision. In 
our scenario, this overhead is impacted by the size of the 
used email sliding window, which corresponds to time 
relative to the number of email processing, instead of an 
absolute time duration. The time spent in filling out the 
data needed for an email window frame and the time 
needed for executing the classifier together decide the 
time overhead for online authentication. 
 
5.1. Offline identity attribution  
 
The training phase for identity attribution takes all 
the data of all the users as input. For ACC comparison. 
we applied seven classifiers both before and after a PCA 
analysis and observed an improvement in accuracy as 
shown in Figure 7. The PCA is used to filter out non-
discriminating features with less variance to contribute 
to classification applications. Such variables therefore 
can confuse the classifiers by having information that is 
not relevant. PCA removes these variables and only 
keeps valuable information, thus reducing noise and 
improving classification models.  
 
 
Figure 7. Before/after PCA performance 
 
In evaluating the performance of offline identity 
attribution, we used 3-fold cross validation for ACC. 
The data set was divided into 3 subsets and the holdout 
method is repeated 3 times. Each time, one of the three 
subsets was used as the test set and the rest two subsets 
are put together to form a training set. Then the average 
ACC across all the three trials was calculated. Lastly, 
we applied traditional validation by setting training and 
testing data ratio to be 75:25 to calculate the AUC of 
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classifiers only after PCA. As shown in Table 1, 
decision tree and random forest present ACC of above 
70% before PCA is applied. After PCA decision tree 
achieving ACC and AUC of 74.7% and 87.5%, 
respectively, proves to be the best classifier for identity 
attribution. That means the model can correctly classify 
the users of both classes with a probability of 74.7% 
while it erroneously classifies the users with a 
probability of approximately one fourth. 
 
Table 1. Identity attribution performance 
Classifier Before PCA After PCA ACC ACC AUC 
K-Nearest 
Neighbors 
0.648 0.701 0.679 
Logistic Regression 0.66 0.721 0.775 
Support Vector 
Machine 
0.634 0.676 0.667 
Linear Discriminant 
Analysis 
0.659 0.659 0.417 
Gaussian Naïve 
Bayes 
0.699 0.717 0.75 
Decision Tree 0.703 0.747 0.875 
Random Forest 0.7 0.712 0.75 
 
5.2. Online authentication 
 
We were more interested in the performance of this 
approach for online authentication. For this, evaluation 
was conducted over of the same 7 classifiers with 
different sliding email window parameters, as shown in 
Tables 2, 3, and 4. Overall, decision tree and random 
forest are two classifiers with the best performance.  
 
Table 2. Online authentication performance 
with l=3, r=1 
Classifier ACC AUC 
K-Nearest Neighbors 0.731 0.608 
Logistic Regression 0.67 0.568 
Support Vector Machine 0.6 0.5 
Linear Discriminant Analysis 0.719 0.611 
Gaussian Naïve Bayes 0.794 0.784 
Decision Tree 0.82 0.865 
Random Forest 0.776 0.814 
 
Table 3. Online authentication performance 
with l=5, r=1 
Classifier ACC AUC 
K-Nearest Neighbors 0.673 0.611 
Logistic Regression 0.682 0.604 
Support Vector Machine 0.62 0.655 
Linear Discriminant Analysis 0.684 0.605 
Gaussian Naïve Bayes 0.761 0.781 
Decision Tree 0.813 0.786 
Random Forest 0.848 0.799 
Table 4. Online authentication performance 
with l=7, r=1 
Classifier ACC AUC 
K-Nearest Neighbors 0.692 0.612 
Logistic Regression 0.698 0.657 
Support Vector Machine 0.6 0.5 
Linear Discriminant Analysis 0.689 0.662 
Gaussian Naïve Bayes 0.67 0.607 
Decision Tree 0.767 0.762 
Random Forest 0.815 0.796 
 
Since we had much more data points for online 
authentication, we employed 5-fold cross validation for 
ACC estimation. With the window size set at 5 and the 
shift at 1, decision tree and random forest achieved an 
ACC of over 81%. And the ACC of the random forest 
classifier was up to 84.8%, being the best. 
The random forest classifier slightly outperforms the 
decision tree classifier in terms of ACC. This may be 
due to that a weighted random forest classifier puts more 
weight on the minority class, inflicting a heavier penalty 
on misclassifying the minority class. Additionally, its 
classification and “randomness” rules employ 
bootstrapping of data and random feature selection [33]. 
This enables the random forest classifier to find 
informative information in small subsets of the data. 
Similarly, we set training and testing data ratio to 
75:25 for AUC estimation. The AUC values range from 
76.2% to 86.5% for the two best classifiers, i.e., decision 
tree and random forest, in the three settings of sliding 
window, again a promising performance. 
These rates of misclassification are comparatively 
higher than many biometrics systems reported. A 
probable explanation is that our user study was 
conducted in a highly uncontrolled manner and the 
participants coming from varying backgrounds might 
not present strong group identities in such behaviors. 
On the other hand, comparing the results derived 
from using different sliding email window parameters l 
and r, there does not exist a clear pattern of how these 
parameters impact the performance of classifiers. 
Empirically we can determine the best parameters on a 
chosen specific application platform, although we have 
not fully examined them in a systematic manner. An 
additional complicating factor is how the nature of 
emails, phishing or legitimate, could impact the use of 
sliding email window. 
Different window sizes can exert an impact on the 
best parameters for KNN, decision tree, and random 
forest. Specially, for Random Forest, the number of 
classification trees is the key parameter affecting its 
performance, which performs the best among a series of 
classifiers. For random forest, in order to get a better 
performance in actual application scenario, the number 
of trees should be more than the number of classes, 
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which is the number of user groups, which is 2 in this 
case. Different window sizes influence Random Forest 
the number of trees needed. Table 5 shows the number 
of trees needed decreases when the size of email 
window grows. Although the number of trees declines 
by one when the window size changes from three to five, 
the average accuracy increases by 7.2% with the AUC 
only declined by 1.5%. 
 
Table 5. Classifier parameter and sliding email 
window size, where KNN-K is the number of 
neighbors; DT-D is the depth of the decision tree; 
RF-N is the number of trees in the forest 
Window Size KNN-K DT-D RF-N 
l = 3 9 8 10 
l = 5 5 9 9 
l = 7 7 10 8 
 
The number of trees also affects the training speed 
and complexity: processing speed would slow down, 
and complexity would escalate when the number of 
trees is growing. The time spent in filling out the data 
needed for the email window and the time needed for 
executing classifier algorithms together decide the delay 
for online authentication. 
 
6. Conclusion and discussion 
 
Behavioral biometrics deals with hardware 
platforms, software environment, and applications. 
Current authentication schemes based on physical or 
behavioral biometrics tend to be independent of 
different application contexts. They can be further 
assisted by behavioral biometrics that take the 
advantage of rich contextual information to a specific 
application. 
This work is among the very few that studied user 
behaviors on web applications. We hosted our user 
study experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
remotely collected user behavioral data, extracted 
features from real user interactions with emails, and 
investigated a set of classifiers for offline group identify 
attribution and online authentication. The study 
demonstrated effectiveness of our methods measured by 
ACC and AUC.  
The preliminary result has shown that the proposed 
authentication scheme is promising, although further 
research is warranted for a real-world implementation. 
Application-dependent user behavioral biometrics can 
encode distinctive identity information that can be used 
to assist and augment traditional authentication 
schemes. The results should also incentivize future 
studies aiming to detect insider attacks based on 
application-specific behaviors. 
In an active authentication setting, a few challenges 
and further considerations arise. First, our experiment 
presents a relatively high misclassification rate, which 
risks forcing legitimate users to respond to challenges 
unnecessarily. Moreover, for the sliding email window 
approach, the tradeoff between the amount of data 
collect by an email window frame and the authentication 
efficiency is delicate to balance. In addition, hosting our 
user study experiment on a remote web platform may 
introduce more variables that need to be put under 
control. A limited scale of dataset and a choice of just 
an application can raise concerns to its validity too. 
Findings or challenges presented in this paper deserve a 
continuing effort in this novel direction of studying 
application context-specific behavioral biometrics. 
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